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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
 
 The Metropolitan District Council of Philadelphia and 
Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, petitions this court for review of a Decision and Order 
of the National Labor Relations Board dismissing an unfair labor 
practice complaint against Leslie Homes, Inc.  The Board found 
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that Leslie Homes did not violate section 8(a)(1) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), when it denied 
petitioner's representatives access to its property to distribute 
"area standards" handbills to potential purchasers of 
condominiums which Leslie Homes was constructing.  The Board had 
jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), and we have jurisdiction 
under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).   
 The facts are not in dispute and are as follows. Leslie 
Homes began constructing Crestwood, a 288 unit condominium 
project, on its property in Bristol, Pennsylvania, in 1988.  At 
the outset of construction the petitioner represented the 
carpenters on the project.  In December 1989, however, Leslie 
Homes started to employ nonunion carpenters at wage rates and 
with benefits below prevailing union standards.  In response, the 
petitioner, on April 1, 1990, attempted to distribute handbills 
to prospective condominium purchasers at Crestwood.  The 
handbills asserted that Leslie Homes was employing 
"foreign/immigrant workers" paid substantially less than 
prevailing, i.e., union wages and benefits, thereby "destroying" 
the fair wages and living standards of area tradesmen.  To 
distribute the handbills, petitioner's representatives stood on 
the sidewalk and walkway in front of a model condominium.  But 
Leslie Homes would not permit the distribution of the handbills 
on its property and, consequently, it directed the handbillers to 
leave.  They refused to leave until the local police at Leslie 
Homes's request directed them to do so.  Subsequently, they 
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distributed the handbills on a public road abutting Leslie 
Homes's property. 
 These events led petitioner to file an unfair labor 
practice charge with the Board, which filing resulted in the 
Board's General Counsel issuing a complaint on September 27, 
1990, contending that Leslie Homes violated section 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA by calling the police to eject petitioner's handbillers. 
Inasmuch as the parties stipulated to the facts, they waived a 
hearing before an administrative law judge.  Consequently, the 
Board transferred the proceeding directly to it.  While the 
matter was pending before the Board, the Supreme Court decided 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 841 (1992), which 
involved issues similar to those here.  Predicated on Lechmere, 
the General Counsel moved to dismiss the complaint.  The Board, 
in a split decision on January 25, 1995, issued its Decision and 
Order dismissing the complaint.  The petitioner then initiated 
the proceedings now before us. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The parties dispute the standard of review.  The 
petitioner contends that the Board decided the matter on legal 
grounds by interpreting and applying Supreme Court precedent and 
it thus contends that in this case we "exercise plenary review of 
[a] question[ ] of law."  Tubari Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 
(3d Cir. 1993).  It also cites NLRB v. Greensburg Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 40 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1994), and Furniture 
Renters of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 
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1994), in support of this contention.  On the other hand, the 
Board urges that our review is deferential both as to the Board's 
conclusions of law and its application of the law to the facts. 
It cites NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 350, 98 S.Ct. 
651, 660 (1978), and Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465 (1951), in support of this 
contention.  We will not linger on the point, because even 
exercising plenary review we agree with the Board and thus will 
deny the petition. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 As is often the situation in labor law, this case 
arises at the intersection of two claims.  On the one hand, 
Leslie Homes, at common law and thus under Pennsylvania law, has 
the general right to decide who may come on to its property.  On 
the other hand, under section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, the 
right of employees "to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection" includes union activity intended 
to protect the area wage and benefit standards that a union has 
negotiated for its members.  Giant Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 
633 F.2d 18, 23 (6th Cir. 1980).  "Area standards" activity, such 
as that involved in this case, is intended to protect wage and 
benefit standards by exerting pressure on nonunion employers with 
a competitive advantage over union employers who pay higher 
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wages.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 1762 n.42 
(1978).  Thus, in this case the conflict is obvious: petitioner 
sought to engage in activities sanctioned under the NLRA on 
property where Leslie Homes exercised its property rights to 
exclude petitioner's representatives. 
 The Supreme Court first balanced the property rights of 
an employer with its employees' rights to engage in concerted 
activity in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 
S.Ct. 982 (1945).  There it held that generally an employer can 
be compelled to allow its employees to distribute literature on 
its property.  However, in NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox, 351 U.S. 
105, 112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 684 (1956), the Court distinguished 
Republic Aviation and held that in general an employer cannot be 
compelled to allow nonemployee organizers to distribute union 
literature on its property.  Id. at 112, 76 S.Ct. at 684.  But 
Babcock included an exception that the employer must grant access 
if nonemployees may not by other reasonable methods communicate 
with the employees.1  
 It is not surprising that the Board frequently has 
addressed the issues raised by unions' reliance on section 7 to 
pursue their activities on employers' property.  Ultimately, in 
Jean Country, 291 NLRB 11 (1988), it determined that it would 
apply a balancing test to accommodate an employer's and its 
                                                           
1The Court also indicated that the employer may not discriminate 
against the union if it allows other distributions on its 
property.  Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112, 76 S.Ct. at 684.  We are not 
concerned with that situation in this case. 
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employees' interests.  In this process, the Board would consider 
"the availability of reasonably effective alternative means [of 
exercising the section 7 rights] as especially significant."  Id. 
at 14.  As might be expected when a balancing test is applied, 
the Board thought that the standards governing the application of 
the balancing test would be developed in an evolutionary process. 
 The regime of Jean Country did not long survive.  In 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 841, the Supreme 
Court addressed a situation in which Lechmere, the employer, 
barred nonemployee union organizers from its property.  The 
organizers had been placing handbills on the windshields of cars 
in a parking lot used by employees.  The Board found that 
Lechmere's actions constituted an unfair labor practice and 
ordered Lechmere to cease and desist from barring the union 
organizers from the parking lot.  The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit denied Lechmere's petition for review and enforced 
the order.  Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 The Supreme Court reversed.  It pointed out that by its 
plain terms the NLRA confers rights only on employees and not on 
unions or their nonemployee organizers.  502 U.S. at 531-32, 112 
S.Ct. at 845.  The Court then indicated that, in Babcock, it had 
recognized that section 7 of the NLRA "may, in certain limited 
circumstances, restrict an employer's right to exclude 
nonemployee union organizers from his property."  Id. at 532, 112 
S.Ct. at 845.  Nevertheless, "[a]s a rule . . . an employer 
cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by 
nonemployee organizers on his property."  Id. at 533, 112 S.Ct. 
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at 846.  The Court said that neither Central Hardware Co. v. 
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 92 S.Ct. 2238 (1972), nor Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U.S. 507, 96 S.Ct. 1029 (1976), modified "Babcock's holding 
that an employer need not accommodate nonemployee organizers 
unless the employees are otherwise inaccessible."  Id. at 534, 
112 S.Ct. at 846.  The Court next pointed out that in Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. it had held "that arguable § 7 claims do not pre-
empt state trespass law, in large part because the trespasses of 
nonemployee union organizers are 'far more likely to be 
unprotected than protected.'"  Id. at 535, 112 S.Ct. at 846-47. 
 The Court then considered Jean Country which it 
described as representing "the Board's latest attempt to 
implement the rights guaranteed by § 7."  502 U.S. at 535, 112 
S.Ct. at 847.  The Court said the Board concluded in Jean Country 
"that it was appropriate to approach every case by balancing § 7 
rights against property rights, with alternative means of access 
thrown in as nothing more than an 'especially significant' 
consideration."  Id. at 538, 112 S.Ct. at 848.  But the Court 
rejected Jean Country, holding that "[s]o long as nonemployee 
union organizers have reasonable access to employees outside an 
employer's property, the requisite accommodation has taken place. 
It is only where such access is infeasible that it becomes 
necessary and proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a 
second level, balancing the employees' and employers' rights." 
Id. 
 Lechmere clearly is controlling here.  In this case the 
Board assumed, without deciding, "that Lechmere permits a union 
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to show that an employer's customers are not reasonably 
accessible by nontresspassory methods, and that union 
representatives therefore may be entitled to engage in area 
standards activities on the employer's property."  316 NLRB 123, 
129 (1995).  It concluded, however, "that reasonable alternative 
means were available to the [petitioner] for communicating its 
area standards message to potential customers of [Leslie Homes]." 
Id. at 131.  The petitioner expressly disclaims challenging this 
finding.  Brief at 5.  Consequently, we are constrained, as the 
petitioner itself asserts, simply to determine whether the Board 
applied the correct legal standard because the facts are not in 
dispute. 
 On this point we have no doubt.  It is beyond argument 
that Lechmere was concerned with protecting private property 
interests.  We can conceive of no reason why this policy would be 
any less compelling in a case in which a union was engaged in 
area standards handbilling than in a case where the union was 
engaged in direct organizational activity.  Indeed, it might be 
supposed that, if anything, the employer's rights would be 
greater when area standards handbilling is involved.  In this 
regard we observe that whereas the interests of potential 
customers of the employer are tangential to the dispute between 
the employer and the union, the employer's employees have a 
significant interest in a union's organizational activity.  See 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 206 n.42, 98 S.Ct. at 1762 n.42 
("[S]everal factors make the argument for protection of 
trespassory area-standards picketing as a category of conduct 
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less compelling than that for trespassing organizational 
solicitation.).2 
 Petitioner seeks to avoid this result by playing on the 
distinction between direct and derivative rights in section 7. 
Petitioner points out that in Lechmere, the nonemployee union 
organizers were asserting an indirect right of access to the 
employer's property in order to encourage the employees to 
organize.  Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 846.  This derivative right is 
based on the fact that "[t]he right of self-organization depends 
in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the 
advantages of self-organization from others."  Babcock, 351 U.S. 
at 113, 76 S.Ct. at 685.  The present case is distinguishable, 
petitioner contends, because here the union organizers were 
exercising a different section 7 right altogether, namely, their 
right as the representatives of a group of employees to engage in 
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection. 
Petitioner concludes from this that Lechmere does not control 
                                                           
2We note that our opinion accords generally with the reading of 
Lechmere in other circuits.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit recently emphasized that "[u]nder the § 7 hierarchy of 
protected activity imposed by the Supreme Court, non-employee 
area-standards picketing warrants even less protection than non-
employee organizational activity."  NLRB v. Great Scot, Inc., 39 
F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 1994).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has refused even to apply Lechmere's 
"inaccessibility exception" where nonemployees target customers 
as opposed to employees.  Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 
991, 997-98 (9th Cir. 1992).  Of course, we have no reason to 
consider whether the "inaccessibility exception" could apply in 
this case, as petitioner does not challenge the Board's finding 
that petitioner had other means to communicate with Leslie 
Homes's customers. 
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this case and that we should remand the cause to the NLRB for 
reconsideration.3 
 We decline to read Lechmere so narrowly.  The question 
is not whether the right is described more aptly as direct or 
derivative, but whether the private property rights of an 
employer must give way to the rights of nonemployee interlopers. 
We believe that primary thrust of Lechmere was to reemphasize the 
protection of employers' private property rights against 
unwarranted intrusions by nonemployees.  The "distinction 'of 
substance'" is between the employees of the employer who is 
asserting his property rights and individuals who do not work for 
that employer but seek access to his property.  Lechmere, 112 
S.Ct. at 848 (citing Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113, 76 S.Ct. at 684). 
In other words, the rule tracks the rather common-sense notion 
that an employer has greater rights against outsiders and 
strangers to his property than he has against those he invites to 
work for him. 
 The case law in this area consistently has analyzed 
these issues in terms of property owners versus interlopers, and 
we believe that the protections afforded property owners against 
trespassory invasions apply whether the outsiders are union 
organizers representing employees from other businesses or union 
organizers acting independently.  The case finally gets down to 
this easily understandable rule of law:  a nonemployee does not 
                                                           
3The Board in its brief suggests that Lechmere itself involved 
direct rather than derivative rights.  In view of our conclusions 
we do not reach this point and instead will treat that case as 
involving derivative rights. 
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have a right of access to the employer's property, at least if he 
has reasonable alternative means to exercise his section 7 rights 
whether they are direct or derivative. 
 The petition for review of the Decision and Order of 
January 25, 1995, will be denied. 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
